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Real Economie Expansion Pauses
VIDENCE of the last six months indicates
that a pause has developed in the prolonged economic
expansion that began in early 1961. In the first part
of 1967, another pause developed which, like the
present one, was preceded by a period of marked
monetary restraint.
A few months ago the major question about eco-
nomic policy was when were the effects of the pro-
gressively more restrictive monetary policy going to
appear. Now that the effects of policy are definitely
evident in trends of total spending and real output,
the major questions are how far will the downturn
go, and how long will it last.
Production has weakened considerably since mid-
1969. Real output of goods and services, which rose at
a4per cent annual rate from 1957 to 1969, increased
at only a 2 per cent rate from the second to the third
quarter last year and showed no increase in the fourth
quarter. Industrial production declined at a 5 per cent
rate from July to December. Payroll employment rose
at only a 1 per cent rate from June to December, com-
pared with a 3.7 per cent rise in the previous year.
Production has responded to a slower growth in de-
mand. Growth of final sales of goods and services
(total sales less those for inventory purposes) de-
clined from an 8.3 per cent annual rate in the first
half of 1969 to a 6.3 per cent rate in the third quarter
and to a 5.8 per cent rate in the fourth quarter. Retail
sales in the last part of 1969 were rising at about a 1
per cent annual rate, compared with a4per cent rate
in late 1968 and early 1969. Sales growth has prob.
ably slowed further in January and early February.
The slower sales growth reflects more restrictive
public policies. In mid-1968, taxes were raised and
growth of Government spending was markedly cur-
tailed. In early 1969 growth of the money supply
slowed from the 7.3 per cent annual rate of the pre-
vious two years to a 4 per cent rate, and then slowed
further to less than a 1 per cent rate from June to
December.
The more restrictive fiscal and monetary actions
were taken with a view to slowing the excessive
spending and inflation and, indirectly and ultimately,
to reducing the inordinately high interest rates. The
general price level, which was nearly stable in the
early Sixties, rose 1.7 per cent during 1985, 3.2 per
cent from the fourth quarter of 1965 to the second
quarter of 1967, 4 per cent in 1988, and 5.1 per cent in
1969.
According to our studies, inflationary pressures may
continue strong as a result of the excesses of the 1965-
68 period. During 1970, prices are likely to rise at
relatively rapid rates. At the same time, as a result of
the delayed effects of the restrictive actions and the
consequent effect on total spending in 1969, total real
output is not likely to rise in 1970 and may even
decline slightly, The rate of unemployment will prob-
ably show a considerable increase in the last half of
the year.
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To put recent developments into perspective this
article reviews briefly the changing character of the
eight and one-half year economic expansion from 1961
to mid-1969, and then discusses the evidences of slow-
down that are appearing in the economy.
Economic Expansion 1961-1968:
Changing Characteristics
In many respects, the early years of the economic
expansion were quite different from the more recent
years. In the 1961 to 1964 period, most of the spend-
ing on goods and services was reflected in a rise of
real output, while prices remained relatively stable.
During this period of surging real output and gen-
erally stable prices, corporate profits before taxes rose
at a 10 per cent average annual rate, personal income
rose at an average rate of 6 per cent, and wages of
production workers in manufacturing industries in-
creased at an average rate of 3.7 per cent. Since prices
remained fairly stable, most of these gains in profits,
income, and wages represented real gains for the
recipients.
In the two-year period from 1964 to 1966, realout-
put and employment expanded more rapidly than
during the previous three years. However, one very
noticeable feature of the 1964-66 period was the more
rapid rise of prices, compared with the 1961-64 period.
In the 1964-66 period the general price index rose at
a 2.3 per cent annual rate, considerably above the 1.3
per cent rate of increase over the previous three years.
The faster increases in prices offset some of the
nominal gains of the recipients of increased profits,
personal income and wages.
In the following two years, 1966-68, except for a
5-6 month period in early 1967, GNP continued to
expand at a rapid rate. However, the economy was
now placed under increasing strain to meet the con-
tinued rapid rise in the demand for real output.
Aceelesatinis Prices
The most striking feature of the 1966-68 period was
the accelerating price level, with the general level of
prices rising at a 3.6 per cent annual rate, almost three
times faster than during the 1961-64 period. In the
later period approximately 50 per cent of the rise in
total spending reflected rising prices.
Recipients of rising levels of wages and other per-
sonal income were affected by accelerating prices.
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For example, though the money wages of production
workers rose at a 4.4 per cent average annual rate
from 1966 to 1968, considerably faster than the 3.7
per cent rate from 1961-64, their real wages rose at
only a 0.9 per cent annual rate from 1966 to 1968.
This rate of real increase in wages was less than half
as rapid as that during the 1964-66 period.
Rapid Rises in Interest Rates
Another noticeable distinction between the first
part of the 1961-69 period and the last half was the
behavior of market interest rates. The 1961-64 period
was characterized by stable or slowly dechning long-
term interest rates and slowly rising short-term rates.
The last half of the period was characterized by
progressively more rapid increases in both long- and
short-term interest rates. These rapid rises in the
level of market interest rates reflected mainly the
acceleration of priccs, which resulted from an overly
expansionary monetary policy. The “historically high
levels of interest rates” reflect not a “tight monetary
policy,” but the eventual results of the very expan-
sionary monetary policy pursued by the Federal Re-
serve until early 1969,
As the economy moved into 1969 the s\vitch in the
predominant characteristics of the economic expan-
sion became even more evident. Over the first half
of 1969, although GNP spending continued to expand
at a 7.4 per cent rate, real output grew at only a 2,3
per cent rate. Approximately 70 per cent of the expan-
sion in GNP was price inflation.
The accelerating prices and rapidly rising interest
rates of the 1965-69 period followed from: (1) the
economy having reached and gone beyond an efficient
level of resource use; (‘2) accelerated growth of
public expenditures resulting in government deficits




In the first half of 1969, in contrast with the pre-
vious two years, policy actions by the Federal Reserve
became less expansive. After mid-1969, policy actions
exerted a very restrictive effect on the monetary ag-
gregates. From January 1967 to January 1969 the
money stock increased at a 7.3 per cent rate. During
the first half of 1969 the growth rate of money was
cut to a 4 per cent annual rate. From June to Decem-
ber there was almost no increase in money balances
held by the public.




l.96S. Mc mixr bank ri. erves declined at a 2.3 per
cent rate from January to December 1969, compared
with a 9 per cent rate of increase over the previous
two years.
The money stock rose sharply in the last half of
December. However, this rapid increase in money
only reflected temporary technical factors. From the
peak in late December, money has declined to an
average at the end of January that is the same as
the average level from June through November 1969.
The Stance of Fiscal Policy
The expansionary monetary actions during the
1967-68 period stemmed from accommodation of large
Federal budget deficits and, after fiscal policy became
restrictive in mid-1968, a desire to cushion an ex-
pected moderation in total spending growth in late
1968. The Federal budget has shown a slight surplus
since 1968, and Government borrowing needs have
been greatly below those of the 1966-68 period. Con-




The progressive slowing in the growth rate of
money has reflected a marked reduction in the growth
of the monetary base and bank reserves. The base
grew at a 3.4 per cent annual rate from January to D
June 1969, compared with a 6.4 per cent rate from
December 1966 to January 1969. From June to Jan-
uary 1970, base money increased at only a 2.7 per
cent rate, less than one-half as rapidly as during
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As currentlyestimated by the Bureau of the Budget,
the Government plans to maIntain a small budget
surplus through mid-1971. Expenditures are projected
to increase 1.5 per cent rate from fiscal 1970 to fiscal
1971. The budget surplus is not expected to increase,
as revenue growth is expected to be slowed by moder-
ate advances of income and profits this year; in addi-
‘tion, the surcharge expiresin June.The recentCongres-
sional changes in tax structure will also serve to re-
duce the growth of revenue. If cur-
rent budget plans are realized, and
they are still subject to Congressional
approval, the stance of fiscal policy
would allow the monetary authorities
considerable discretion in formulating
monetary policy.
Interest Rates
From 1965 to 1969 the sharp rise of
interest rates resulted mainly from the
increasing demand for loan funds,
which, in turn derived increasingly
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If economic expansion is evaluated solely by the
rate of increase of GNP spending, the restrictive ef-
fect of policy actions has become apparent only in
recent months. The expansion of CNP slowed to a 6.2
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prcent rate in the second half of 1969, somewhat
slower than over the first half of the year. From the
second quarter of 1969 to the third quarter of 1969,
GNP rose at an 8 per cent annual rate, then slowed
to a 4.4 per cent rate from the third to fourth quarter.
Table II
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from rising anticipations of inflation. In 1989 the
short-run impact effects of the reduced rate of ex-
pansion of the monetary base reinforced the upward
pressures of price expectations on market interest
rates. Consequently, market interest rates rose very
rapidly in 1969. A sharp short-run impetus to market
interest rates was to be expected to follow from a
much reduced rate of expansion of base money.
However, as the effects of the reduced growth
rate of money continue to result in reduced demand
for real output and consequently a reduction in the
demand for credit and less upward pressure on com-
modity prices, there should be easing in credit market
interest rates.
Total Spending and Components
the responsibility of financing large Government bor-
rowing and have been free to pursue a restrictive
policy.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS FEBRUARY. 1970
Using criteria other than the broad yardstick of
total spending, there is considerable evidence that
the “economic expansion” came to a halt in late
1969. Since mid-1969 the index of industrial pro-
duction has declined, while real output and payroll
employment have both grown at barely a one per
cent rate. Although the dollar value of final sales rose
at a 6 per cent rate in the last half of 1969, the real
volume of final sales showed almost no increase,
compared to a 4.2 per cent annual rate of growth in
real volume during 1966-68.
Personal income rose at about a 5 per cent annual
rate in late 1969, down from a 9 per cent rate in the
preceding year. Taking the rapid rise in prices into
account, increases in personal income during the last
four months of 1969 represented no gain in real com-
mand over goods and services. The slowing in per-
sonal income growth has been reflected in a decline in
the growth of consumption expenditures, which rose
at a 5.8 per cent rate over the last half of 1969 com-
pared to an 8.2 per cent rate over the first half of
the year.
Gross private domestic investment increased at a
lA per cent annual rate during the last half of 1969,
compared to a 5.3 per cent rate over the first six
months of 1969. This is the only one of the three
major components of GNP that showed a sharp ac-
celeration during the last half of 1969. However, this
sharp increase in investment during the second half
reflected a large increase in the third quarter. From
the third quarter to the fourth quarter, investment
spending declined at a 2.5 per cent annual rate,
One area of investment spending that has attracted
considerable concern is business expenditure on new
plant and equipment. New capital equipment spend-
ing by business in 1969 is estimated to have increased
11 per cent, compared to about a 4 per cent increase
in 1968. The most recent survey by the Department
of Commerce and Securities Exchange Commission
indicates that the business sector plans to increase
its spending on new plant and equipment by an
additional 9.7 per cent in 1970.
When the rise in prices of machinery and equip-
ment are taken into account, using the wholesale
price index for machinery and equipment, the 11 per
cent increase in 1969 represents about a 7.8 per cent
rise in real terms. This increase in real terms, although
quite large, is well below the average rate of increase
in real terms of 14 per cent over the two years from
1964 to 1966. Assuming no acceleration in prices of
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machinery and equipment for 1970, the 9.7 per cent
projected rise in spending would represent only a 6.4
per cent real increase.
The projected rise in spending on new plant and
equipment is not evenly spread over all industries.
The projected rise in manufacturing industries is only
6.4 per cent, or about 3.2 per cent after an adjustment
for a continued rise in prices. Of the twenty-one major
industry categories in the Department of Commerce
— SEC Survey, respondents in nine of the twenty-one
industry categories project no change or a decrease
in capital spending. For example, the motor vehicles
and parts industry projects no increase in capital
spending, and therefore a decline in real terms.
Corporate profits are already beginning to show
noticeable signs of the deceleration of the growth in
total spending. After rising through the first half of
1969, profits declined after midyear. As the slowing in
realpersonal income continues, as the rate of increase
of payroll employmentcontinues to slow, and if a sharp
increase in government demand for goods and serv-
ices does not arise to offset the slowing in real pri-
vate demand, business will likely revise downsvard
its expectations of future demand for real output.
Consequently, a significant part of the anticipated
spending by the business sector on new plant and
equipment may not materialize as 1970 progresses.
A Real Interest Rate Gnideline
Although market interest rates on long-term capital
borrowing rose very rapidly in 1969, they apparently
had little effect in dampening the business sectors’ de-
mand for credit. If, instead of focusing attention on
market interest rates, real interest rates are con-
sidered, then this anomaly of rising market interest
rates and rising demands for long-term credit largely
disappears. The real costs of long-term borrowing
declined slightly over the first three quarters of 1969.
Only in the last part of 1969 did the real cost of
borrowing show a significant upward movement.
Ceilings and Channels of Credit Flaws
As credit market interest rates rose to high levels
in 1969, the policies of the Federal Reserve, Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, and Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, which impose ceiling rates on the
interest rates commercial banks, mutual savings banks,
and savings and loan institutions can pay to attractde-
posits, favored borrowing by large corporations. Large
businessborrowers with direct access to the money and
capital markets, by issuing bonds and commercialFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
paper, were able to competitively bid funds away
from savings institutions. In 1969 the outstanding
volume of commercial paper averaged $27.3 billion,
up from $19.4 billion in 1968, and double the average
outstanding volume in 1966. In 1967 and 1968 the
household sector reduced its holdings of municipal
and corporate securities. However, in the first half
of 1969, the household sector increased its holdings
of these securities by approximately $9.7 billion.
As funds flowed through channels other than the
savings institutions, the ability of these institutions
to extend credit to specific sectors of the economy,
especially housing, was reduced. Although such a
process of fund diversion probably did not affect
total credit considerably, it had a significant effect
on the locus and form of real investment.
In mid-January, the Federal Reserve Board, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board raised the maximum
rates intermediaries are permitted to pay for funds.
Under the amended Regulation Q effective January
21, member banks are permitted to pay 4.5 per cent
on passbook savings deposits, up from the 4 per cent
ceiling in effect since November 1964. Small certifi-
cates maturing in one year are permitted to yield 5.50
per cent, and small certificates maturing in two years
are permitted to yield 5.75 per cent (See the table
on page 29 for all Regulation Q ceilings). Previously,
since September 1966, the ceiling on all single matur-
ity deposits less than $100,000 had been 5 per cent.
However, these new ceiling rates are still below
the market yields available to many savers on com-
petitive financial assets. For example, in mid-January
the yield on commercial paper and Treasury bills,
which are directly competitive with large CD’s, were
8.75 per cent and 7.80 per cent respectively. Seasoned
corporate bonds, which are partial competitors for
savings deposits, were yielding about 7.90 per cent,
compared to the new ceiling rates that savings insti-
tutions could offer of 5 to 5.75 per cent.
Frices
If one looks at prices, evidence of the effect of
restriction imposed by policy since midyear is not
clearly evident. In the second half of 1969 the general
price index rose at the same 5.1 per cent annual rate
as during the first half of the year. In the fourth quar-
ter of 1969 the general price index showed a slower
4.7 per cent rate of increase. However, monthly data
on consumer and wholesale prices cast some doubt on
the degree of reduction of price increases in the last
quarter of 1969. From September to December con-
sumer prices rose at a 6.3 per cent annual rate,
slightly faster than over the first nine months of 1969.
The rate of increase of wholesale prices also rose in
the last three months of 1969, increasing from an
annual rate of 4.6 per cent over the first nine months
to a rate of 5.4 per cent from September to December,
The rate of increase of wholesale prices of industrial
commodities accelerated to a 5 per cent rate, com-
pared to a 3.6 per cent rate from December 1968 to
September 1969.
Conclusions
If, instead of a myopic concentration on the rapid
increase in prices, analysis of current economic con-
ditions is broadened to take into account lags between
policy actions and theft effects on policy goals such
as the growth of real output, production, employment
and real income, then a downward turn in economic
activity has begun. Now that the restrictive effects
of policy actions are definitely evident in the real
sector of the economy, attention should be focused
on the questions of how far and how fast will the
downturn go, and when should the Federal Reserve
move to a moderately easier policy?
Prices have shown very little sign of slowing their
rapid rates of increase, and market interest rates re-
main at very high levels. However, economic theory
and empirical evidence indicate that after a prolonged
period of inflation, a downward adjustment of prices
and interest rates follows only slowly after real out-
put, real income, and employment adjust downward,
Given the difference between the lags of adjustment
of prices and interest rates to a restrictive monetary
policy and real output and employment, a policy of
“waiting to see the svhites of the eyes” of the inflation
enemy manifested in prices and interest rates, can
have considerable unnecessary adverse consequences
for real output, income, and employment.
One step that monetary policy should avoid is a
sharp reversal to a very expansionary policy such as oc-
curred during the 1967 pause in economic activity.
However, if a restrictive policy is pushed too far too
fast, by creating a large rise in unemployment, such
a policy may lay the groundwork for just such a
sharp reversal, If after mid-1970 policymakers
face a 5.5 or 6.0 per cent unemployment rate, then it
may be very difficult to avoid a sharp reversal of
policy. In such a case, the chance of throwing all the
hard-won effects of monetary restraint to the winds
becomes very great.
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